Iran had, after its covert nuclear program came to light more than two decades ago, consistently stressed that it was pursuing exclusively peaceful aims and did not intend to develop nuclear weapons. The then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced this line with a fatwa banning such weapons. Since his death at the hands of the United States and Israel last month, however, there are signs that particularly hardline forces within the system could reassess this religious-legal directive; public debate in Iran is already moving in that direction.
For years, Khamenei had fended off internal pressure to authorize the construction of a nuclear bomb, especially after US President Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018. Instead, faced with growing hostility from the United States and Israel, Khamenei relied on what is described as “strategic patience”: Iran steadily advanced uranium enrichment, bringing it closer to weapons-grade levels without taking the step into actual bomb development.
Calls for a nuclear bomb grew louder after Israel carried out an unprecedented military operation against Iran last year that killed several military and nuclear leaders. The debate gained further momentum after Trump ordered strikes on three of Iran’s most important nuclear sites. As early as 2024, Ahmad Haqtalab, the Revolutionary Guards commander responsible for protecting nuclear facilities, had said that a departure from previous principles of nuclear policy was “likely and conceivable.”
Iran has not yet announced any public change of course. The country does, however, possess more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which could be enough—if the fatwa were overturned—to produce several nuclear weapons. The new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of the late Ali Khamenei, is said by people around him to be in hiding, fueling speculation about his health and decision-making ability as the Revolutionary Guards continue to expand their influence.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Al Jazeera this month that he did not know the new leader’s “jurisprudential or political stance” on nuclear weapons. He said he assumed the line would not differ greatly from previous policy, but that it was necessary to wait until Mojtaba Khamenei’s views became known. A first address attributed to him consisted of a statement read by a news anchor on state television, in which he vowed to avenge his father’s death and other wartime losses, without mentioning the nuclear program.
At the same time, domestic pressure to change nuclear policy is growing. Observers point to the Revolutionary Guards consolidating power and bringing hardline retired commanders back into leadership roles to guide a younger, more vengeful generation of fighters. In a segment broadcast on state television this month, hardline commentator Nasser Torabi called for Iran to take steps to produce or possess nuclear weapons and said the country would be regarded as a global superpower after the war.
Experts say that building a nuclear weapon would hinge on overturning the fatwa, gaining access to highly enriched uranium, and having the capability to build a functioning device. If Iran has access to its uranium stockpile, the regime could initially opt for a simpler nuclear device rather than a sophisticated, missile-deliverable weapon. Such a less complex design could still produce a real nuclear explosion, but would chiefly have political value by demonstrating nuclear capability and signaling deterrence.
Deterrence, however, is not regarded as guaranteed, in part because of Iran’s limited range and the nuclear balance of power with the United States. Experts note that Iran’s deterrence policy over decades has focused primarily on regional rivals such as Iraq and Israel, and more recently Saudi Arabia. In the event of an Iranian nuclear weapons push, a regional domino effect is also being discussed, as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in 2018 that Saudi Arabia would follow “as soon as possible” if Iran developed a nuclear bomb.
Source: CNN