Free Speech Surpression – New Low Point Reached By US. 1 Million $ Reward For Killing An Iranian Academic – Are Western Journalists Next? BRICS Journalists Are Already Being Killed

A verified X account named “Terror Alarm,” which presents itself as a counterterrorism watchdog and openly supports pro‑Israel positions, promoted a crowdfunding campaign on X in March 2026 offering a $1 million bounty. The graphic post called for the “capture” of Iranian professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi, explicitly “alive.” The ad appeared with labels indicating paid distribution and was reshared in multiple variants; users reported the content, but according to several observers the platform did not remove it. Marandi publicly described the bounty as support for terrorism against him; supporters argued that a comparable call targeting Western or Israeli academics would likely have been handled differently.

Marandi is a professor of English literature at the University of Tehran. He is described as an English‑language commentator who appears in Western and regional media and explains Iranian positions on U.S. and Israeli policy. In the promoted call he was portrayed as an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader and as aligned with propaganda. The post used the language of a manhunt and linked it to a monetary “reward” for the arrest.

Terror Alarm describes itself as a project that developed in several phases: from a “Terror Alarm App” during the period of Islamic State attacks in Europe, to “Terror Alarm Security” as a private security and alerting service (2016 to 2022), and then a repositioning as an EU‑registered nonprofit from 2022 onward. As a registered association, Terror Alarm is listed in Denmark (CVR 44425645); registry information names businessman René Rønneberg as the association’s official representative, who according to Danish company data has held owner or director roles in various firms since 2004. Publicly accessible profiles on Rønneberg reportedly contain little additional information; directories mainly list an address, the CVR number, and contact details, without describing the brand’s international online activity.

In its self‑descriptions, Terror Alarm says it is independent and self‑funded, run by activists and journalists from several countries, without naming a founder, board, or staff. On a March 2023 webpage, the core team was described, in its own account, as of Jewish descent. At the same time, extensive technical claims are outlined: “Terror Alarm AI” is presented as a “Strategist” or “anti‑terror agentic AI” intended to analyze news and content from a wide range of sources, including websites, blogs, the deep web, the dark web, Telegram, Reddit, X, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and traditional media. In its own descriptions, it also refers to using leaked or possibly hacked data and “intercepted communications” that could come from intelligence services where legally possible; the data would be stored in a continuously updated repository enabling forecasts and automated risk assessments.

A service described as “Proactive Digital Threat Monitoring” is said to continuously monitor digital activity, assign a “Predictive Radicalisation Score,” and, once thresholds are crossed, trigger an “Automated Intervention Protocol.” Measures mentioned include digital restrictions up to a kind of “lockdown,” limits on online activity, and automated alerts to “trusted contacts.” The account frames the bounty campaign against Marandi within this architecture and describes it as the outcome of a system that classifies people as risks using opaque models and then publicly flags them.

Politically, Terror Alarm portrays itself in its own materials as a supporter of Israel, Ukraine, and other U.S.‑aligned actors and separatist causes. A profile document lists a Signal contact number with the +972 country code associated with Israel; it also states that its NGO structure is open to members from NATO states (with exceptions) as well as Israel, Taiwan, Kosovo, Kurdistan, and Ukraine. A Telegram welcome message emphasizes being pro‑Israel but not affiliated with the State of Israel; at the same time, the stated mission includes preventing terror and fighting antisemitism, alongside supporting Israel and other political causes. The channels are described as distributing narratives that resemble Israeli and NATO positions, including on Iran, Palestinian resistance, and Western policy toward Iran.

In August 2025, the Tehran‑based Association for Defending Victims of Terrorism (ADVT), as described in the piece, sent a formal letter to Telegram demanding the closure of the Terror Alarm channel. The letter calls Terror Alarm a “terrorist media outlet” and attributes it to Israeli security organizations including Mossad; it also claims Israeli security and military services use the channel for psychological operations. It describes a pattern in which rumors, claims, and “leaks” about Iranian officials first appear on Terror Alarm and are later echoed by Israeli officials or Western media; Terror Alarm is said to have responded by listing the ADVT itself as “terrorist.”

The piece contrasts this with a legal perspective, pointing to U.S. federal law that criminalizes solicitation of violence, kidnapping, and related threatening communications. It cites 18 U.S.C. § 373 (solicitation of a “crime of violence”), 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping, including “for ransom or reward”), and 18 U.S.C. § 875 (communications containing threats, including kidnapping or demands connected to kidnapping). The promoted bounty for the “capture” of a named person is presented as close to these provisions, while prosecution is characterized as a political decision.

At international and European levels, the piece references human‑rights touchpoints, including the right to life (Article 6) and protection from arbitrary arrest (Article 9) under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also points to warnings that automated risk analytics and threat‑scoring used for online counterterrorism can be abused to suppress dissent and target minorities. Potential regulatory frameworks mentioned include the UK Online Safety Act 2023, enforced by Ofcom, and the EU Digital Services Act, which requires very large platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks from illegal content and to act on notifications.

In this context, it emphasizes that X kept the bounty graphic online despite complaints and accepted it as paid distribution. The ad named Marandi, set the amount at $1 million, and called for his capture “alive” in a “Terror Alarm” branded image with “Paid Partnership” labeling and the X post dated March 19, 2026.

Source: 21st Century Wire