In late March 2026, Moscow remained noticeably restrained in its official response to the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran, which had begun almost a month earlier. In the Russian debate, the operation was viewed as an expression of an aggressive and hard-to-predict U.S. policy that devalues negotiations when military strikes occur in the middle of ongoing talks. In Russia, this reportedly caused shock, because the approach was perceived as “gangster-like” and unusually ruthless, and because it led to the conclusion that understandings with Washington could be called into question at short notice. This perception is linked to the thesis that such an approach could isolate the United States internationally and weaken its own global position.
At the same time, a domestic political tension surrounding President Putin is described: he continues to cling to the idea of negotiating with Donald Trump, while rejection grows within the military, his circle, and public opinion. One reason cited is an earlier drone incident that was interpreted as an attempted attack on Putin and, in this account, reinforced the impression that Trump does not fully control his own administration. Putin is said to derive from this a strategy of maintaining a willingness to talk in order to exploit divisions within the Western alliance and prevent a unified Western front against Russia. As an achievement of this line, it is claimed that there has been no U.S. aid to Ukraine, while Europe is described as financially, militarily, and politically too weak to make up for it.
Regarding Iran, the partnership is characterized as pragmatic, without a formal mutual defense agreement, but with the assertion that an Iranian defeat or fragmentation would be unacceptable from Russia’s perspective. In this argument, Iran is considered geopolitically central, among other reasons because of access to the Indian Ocean and alternative transport routes that could make Russia less dependent on potentially blockable routes via the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, or strategic straits. In addition, Iran’s role in BRICS, its large domestic market, and the shared experience of Western sanctions are emphasized; officially, military cooperation in the form of sales and exchanges is referenced, including conflicting reports about possible deliveries of S‑400 systems that Moscow has not clearly confirmed. A long-term goal is outlined as reducing the U.S. military and economic presence in the Middle East, while also pointing to Russia’s ties with Gulf states via OPEC+ and to non-strategic, primarily humanitarian links with Israel.
Economically, Russia is portrayed as benefiting from higher energy prices, which, under this view, came at a particularly opportune time after a difficult year in 2025 with growth of only about 1%. An even more important possible structural effect is described: if less oil and gas were exported from the Persian Gulf, market share in Asia could open up for Russian supplies, especially as Russia is already shifting its focus away from Europe toward Asian markets. In this context, the movement of capital flows from Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong is cited as a sign of stronger financial momentum in Asia, along with the thesis of a longer-term shift away from the dollar toward a greater role for the yuan. Also mentioned is the claim that 10 to 15% of Russia’s population is Muslim, corresponding to roughly 14 to 20 million people.